The Buddhist view of personal identity is also a no-self theory ..
Cohen: But really now, what is so egregiously wrong about identifying the survivor with the brain donor? Indeed, perhaps it was misguided to construe the issue of continued survival in terms of personal identity in the first place, since that only seems to invite the transitivity problems. (p. 416)
Erikson’s “identity”: an essay on the ..
CITATION: Nimbalkar N., (2011), John Locke on Personal Identity. In: Brain, Mind and Consciousness: An International, Interdisciplinary Perspective (A.R. Singh and S.A. Singh eds.), MSM, 9(1), p268-275.
(Just as inthe — in this case necessary — proposition "7 isidentical with the smallest prime numbergreater than 5.") When I say that a sensation is abrain process or that lightning is an electric dis-charge I do not mean just that the sensation issomehow spatially or temporally continuouswith the brain process or that the lightning isjust spatially or temporally continuous with thedischarge.
Essay about Personal Identity - Memory Theory vs …
Nevertheless, even if this objection to Locke is thwarted, the others remain in force. For one thing, memory does seem to presuppose personal identity, and so cannot constitute a criterion of it. For another, identity is a transitive relation, while memory isn’t, so the latter cannot be a criterion of the former. Finally, there is the obvious worry that identity seems to persist through the loss of memory: it’s hard to believe that I would cease to exist were I to undergo amnesia. It’s for all these reasons that contemporary theorists working in the Lockean tradition have had to make significant changes to the theory to make it a viable contender for the relation between identity and ethics (Shoemaker, 2008).
the judgements of personal identity via an ‘immaterial soul’
This is sometimes called the problem of “synchronicidentity”, as opposed to the “diachronic identity”of the persistence question. These terms need careful handling,however. They are apt to give the mistaken impression that identitycomes in two kinds, synchronic and diachronic. The truth is simplythat there are two kinds of situations where we can ask how manypeople (or other things) there are: those involving just one momentand those involving several.
A judgement of personal identity is being ..
11. Personal identity in change of substance. That this is so, we have some kind of evidence in our very bodies, all whose particles, whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are touched, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, as a part of ourselves; i.e. of our thinking conscious self. Thus, the limbs of his body are to every one a part of Himself; he sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off a hand, and thereby separate it from that consciousness he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself, any more than the remotest part of matter. Thus, we see the substance whereof personal self consisted at one time may be varied at another, without the change of personal identity; there being no question about the same person, though the limbs which but now were a part of it, be cut off.
On Personal identity essaysAt ..
From conception, we exist and also acquire a soul to live through a numerical identity from life until death.
Body theory is basing off of your body is the same from birth unto death
Soul theory is the changing of the soul and that makes people change who they are