We can define truth for atomic sentences of L′in the following way.
Such a proposal might suggest there are multiple concepts of truth, orthat the term ‘true’ is itself ambiguous. However, whetheror not a pluralist view is committed to such claims has beendisputed. In particular, Lynch (2001b; 2009) develops a version ofpluralism which takes truth to be a functional role concept. Thefunctional role of truth is characterized by a range of principlesthat articulate such features of truth as its objectivity, its role ininquiry, and related ideas we have encountered in considering varioustheories of truth. (A related point about platitudes governing theconcept of truth is made by Wright (1992).) But according to Lynch,these display the functional role of truth. Furthermore, Lynch claimsthat on analogy with analytic functionalism, these principles can beseen as deriving from our pre-theoretic or ‘folk’ ideasabout truth.
The truthmaker principle is often put as the schema:
The coherence theory of truth enjoys two sorts of motivations. One isprimarily epistemological. Most coherence theorists also hold acoherence theory of knowledge; more specifically, a coherence theoryof justification. According to this theory, to be justified is to bepart of a coherent system of beliefs. An argument for this is oftenbased on the claim that only another belief could stand in ajustification relation to a belief, allowing nothing but properties ofsystems of belief, including coherence, to be conditions forjustification. Combining this with the thesis that a fully justifiedbelief is true forms an argument for the coherence theory oftruth. (An argument along these lines is found in Blanshard (1939),who holds a form of the coherence theory closely related toJoachim's.)
While Hamlet tries to pick up the pieces of his shattered idealism, he consciously embarks on a quest to seek the truth hidden in Elsinore; this mission of Hamlet?s is in stark contrast to Claudius.
Idealism And Truth Essays - Arbor Lawn and Tree
Both the approaches to realism, through reference and through bivalence, make truth the primary vehicle for an account of realism. A theory of truth which substantiates bivalence, or builds truth from a determinate reference relation, does most of the work of giving a realistic metaphysics. It might even simply be a realistic metaphysics.
Truth (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
It is often argued that these theses require some form of thecorrespondence theory of truth. (Putnam (1978, p. 18) notes,“Whatever else realists say, they typically say that theybelieve in a ‘correspondence theory of truth’.”) Atleast, they are supported by the kind of correspondence theory withoutfacts discussed in section 3.1, such as Field's proposal. Such atheory will provide an account of objective relations of reference andsatisfaction, and show how these determine the truth or falsehood ofwhat we say about the world. Field's own approach (1972) to thisproblem seeks a physicalist explanation of reference. But realism is amore general idea than physicalism. Any theory that provides objectiverelations of reference and satisfaction, and builds up a theory oftruth from them, would give a form of realism. (Making the objectivityof reference the key to realism is characteristic of work of Putnam,e.g., 1978.)
Death of a Salesman Idealism and Truth Essay - 964 …
In discussing the approach to correspondence of section 3.1, we notedthat it has few ontological requirements. It relies on there beingobjects of reference, and something about the world which makes fordeterminate satisfaction relations; but beyond that, it isontologically neutral. But as we mentioned there, this is not to saythat it has no metaphysical implications. A correspondence theory oftruth, of any kind, is often taken to embody a form ofrealism.
The imbalance of idealism and truth in an ..
In light of our discussion in section 1.1.1, we should pause to notethat the connection between realism and the correspondence theory oftruth is not absolute. When Moore and Russell held the identity theoryof truth, they were most certainly realists. The right kind ofmetaphysics of propositions can support a realist view, as can ametaphysics of facts. The modern form of realism we have beendiscussing here seeks to avoid basing itself on such particularontological commitments, and so prefers to rely on the kind ofcorrespondence-without-facts approach discussed in section 3.1. Thisis not to say that realism will be devoid of ontological commitments,but the commitments will flow from whichever specific claims aboutsome subject-matter are taken to be true.