Review Essay: Culture and Identity
On the other hand, if FDS is not identical to EAS — if, instead, she is a different person, or is at least a different self — then it may not be so obvious what the conflict is afterall, for FDS has made her preferences clear, and if she is importantly distinct from the signer of the advance directive, then there seems little reason why the interests of EAS are relevant at all to FDS's life. But then again, FDS is not competent, and EAS, if not identical to her, is at least akin to her closest relative, one might think, in which case her earlier wishes perhaps ought to hold sway after all (see Luttrell and Sommerville 1996). (But EAS and FDS will be very psychologically different, we are supposing, so why think they are closely related at all? Indeed, wouldn't FDS be more closely “related” to her fellow end-stage Alzheimer's patients? So why think EAS has any more right to make life-or-death decisions about her than any of these others?)
Entity and Identity: And Other Essays book by P F …
We are called Hebrews, Ivriim, because we inherited that legacy of Abraham. We are a lonely people, persecuted throughout most of history. Generation after generation tried to convince us we are wrong. Sometimes those efforts appeared polite and more often they were accompanied by the sword. To be a Jew historically meant trouble. It meant exclusion from guilds, second class citizenship at best, and being the scapegoat for society’s problems. Yet we remained and remain to this day apart and unique in our faith and customs. We maintain our national language and distinct identity, and despite our small numbers, have persevered in a way that no other people have or could have. This is so despite centuries of temptation to abandon our heritage. Jews are different, and are proud of it.
The root cause of anti-Semitism lies in the strength of Jewish identity. Like any group with a strong focus on in group/out group identity, constant reference to differences invites constant awareness of differences. It is by no means a problem unique to Judaism and therefore can never be resolved as long as it is thought of as a unique or discrete Jewish issue. If Jewish leaders and writers spent more time and effort drawing comparison of their struggles to those of others, and less time focusing on just Jewish persecution, we can isolate the most ignorant and hateful sources of anti-Semitism from the mainstream. Jewish people have just as deep of a history of contribution and collaboration with other cultures as they do of persecution, and focusing on the similarities rather than the differences is the only useful way forward. Easier said than done, but worth the effort, for any group or culture.
The Problem of Personal Identity essay ..
Now one might think the Biological Criterion could easily handlesuch cases, but it can't. That's again because it's not in virtue ofher being the same human that we continue to treatsomeone in a PVS or in the end stages of dementia, say, as identicalto her pre-PVS self. Rather, it's in virtue of her being thesame animal that we do so. This is the core of what wemay call the , recently advanced anddefended by Marya Schechtman (Schechtman 2014). (Schechtman herselfcalls this the “person-life view,” but this label ismisleading for our purposes, as what she means by “person”isn't Lockean; for instance, she assigns personhood even to fetusesand those in a PVS. It is preferable, therefore, to stick with theanthropological label for the sake of clarity and distinction from theother views on the table.)
Personal Identity Essay - Angelfire
Mention should here be made of influential criticisms of the identitytheory by Saul Kripke and David Chalmers respectively. It will not bepossible to discuss them in great detail, partly because of the factthat Kripke's remarks rely on views about modality, possible worldssemantics, and essentialism which some philosophers would want tocontest, and because Chalmers' long and rich book would deserve alengthy answer. Kripke (1980) calls an expression a rigid designator ifit refers to the same object in every possible world. Or in counterparttheory it would have an exactly similar counterpart in every possibleworld. It seems to me that what we count as counterparts is highlycontextual. Take the example ‘water is H2O’. Inanother world, or in a twin earth in our world as Putnam imagines(1975), the stuff found in rivers, lakes, the sea would not beH2O but XYZ and so would not be water. This is certainlygiving preference to real chemistry over folk chemistry, and so far Iapplaud this. There are therefore contexts in which we say that on twinearth or the envisaged possible world the stuff found in rivers wouldnot be water. Nevertheless there are contexts in which we couldenvisage a possible world (write a science fiction novel) in whichbeing found in rivers and lakes and the sea, assuaging thirst andsustaining life was more important than the chemical composition and soXYZ would be the counterpart of H2O.
On any view of personal identity other than four ..
Now I may tell a one-sided or downright false story. To correctthe story, therefore, we may have to check it against third-personnarratives of my life. But third-person narratives are not going tobe restricted just to what happened to me while I was a Lockeanperson. They will also include things I did or that happened to mewhen I was an infant, or even a fetus (“You kicked so hardduring that last month of pregnancy,” says my mother). And theymay well include what happens to me after falling into a PVS (“Ivisited him every day and talked to him,” says my mother).These are social treatments that also seem grounded by attributions ofidentity, such as , or .But neither the Psychological Criterion nor the Biological Criterioncan account for them in a straightforward way.